The vexed question of a Liu Xiaobo Nobel Peace Prize win

Activists holding photos of Liu Xiaobo. Photo by AP

One of the potential recipients of this year’s Nobel Peace Prize, due to be announced tomorrow, is Liu Xiaobo, one of China’s most famed dissidents who was last year imprisoned to 11 years for ‘inciting subversion’, having co-authored the pro-democracy document Charter 08.

Modelled on Czechoslovakia’s Charter 77, the polemic called for multi-party elections, independent courts and greater freedom of expression in the People’s Republic. It garnered around 7,000 signatures both in China and internationally, and warned of “the possibility of a violent conflict of disastrous proportions” if Beijing failed to reform the one-party authoritarian state.

The possibility of Liu receiving the prize does not sit well with Beijing, with China’s Foreign Ministry calling it “totally wrong.” The head of the Norwegian Nobel Institute, Geir Lundestad, also revealed that China’s Deputy Foreign Minister, Fu Ying, warned him that Liu’s win “would pull the wrong strings in relations between Norway and China, it would be seen as an unfriendly act.”

According to Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Jiang Yu, the fundamental issue is that Liu violated Chinese law. “His acts are completely contrary to the purpose of the Nobel Peace Prize,” she said.

Human rights and pro-democracy activists, however, have marched behind Liu’s cause. Vaclav Havel, the author of Charter 77, wrote in support of Liu’s potential win. Soon after, a Chinese petition signed by 300 scholars, former government officials, lawyers and factory workers followed:

We ask the Nobel Committee to honor Liu Xiaobo’s more than two decades of unflinching and peaceful advocacy for reform, and to make him the first Chinese recipient of that prestigious award. In doing so, the Nobel Committee would signal both to Liu and to the Chinese government that many inside China and around the world stand in solidarity with him, and his unwavering vision of freedom and human rights for the 1. 3 billion people of China.

Liu is no stranger to the world of Chinese dissent. He cut short a visiting scholarship at Columbia University to return to Beijing and participate in the deadly student and workers’ protests in Tiananmen Square in 1989, during which he took part in high-profile hunger strikes. Authorities labelled him one of the protest’s ringleaders, and he served an 18 month jail sentence for ‘counter-revolution.’

Throughout the first half of the 1990s, he wrote a number of essays advocating freedom of expression, promoting human rights and criticising the government. However, he was eventually sentenced to three years of manual labour in a re-education camp, being released in 1999.

Nor is he the only Chinese activist to be shortlisted for the prize. Human rights lawyer Gao Zhisheng and AIDS activist Hu Jia were both favourites in 2008, having lost out to Finnish former president Martti Ahtisaari. Hu was nominated again in 2009, though lost out to a one Barack Obama.

Were Liu to receive the prize, it would certainly be an embarrassment to Beijing over China’s poor human rights record. It would also undoubtedly boost global attention to Charter 08 and similar writings, which would otherwise remain in circulation among small pockets of Chinese citizens. It may intensify international pressure on China to instigate political reform, changes that Premier Wen Jiabao has himself alluded to over the past few weeks.

But it will take more than a Liu win to kick-start political reform in the PRC. Action at a policy level and legal changes, as discussed by scholar Pan Wei, namely in clarifying the role of civil society, are fundamental. At best, Liu’s potential success would raise awareness of dissent in China. How long-lasting this awareness will be remains to be seen.

But, as with most things in China, matters could also go to the other extreme, and a potential Liu win might backfire. In drawing attention to China’s human rights abuses and raising the profile of those pushing for change, Beijing will not only lose face, but the Communist Party’s entire legitimacy – its monopoly of authority – will be brought into question. For the CCP, this is a non-negotiable. In retaliation, the CCP might toughen its stance on China’s other dissidents.

Such a response occurred, for instance, after Liu’s imprisonment in December 2009. Tan Zuoren, who worked with Ai Weiwei in investigating the deaths of children in schools that collapsed in the Sichuan earthquake, was sentenced to five years for subversion in February. One month later, the outspoken writer Liao Yiwu was banned from leaving the country to attend a German literary festival.

In rallying behind Liu – and I should make it clear I greatly respect him for his bravery – it is important to remember how his followers might well bear the brunt of a tougher government only too willing to lead a crackdown on dissent.

Beijing has made it abundantly clear it does not want Liu Xiaobo to win tomorrow’s prize. If he does, and how China would respond, are anticipated.

Premier Wen: the need for democracy and freedom is “irresistible”

Premier Wen Jiabao at the 2009 World Economic Forum. Image from the World Economic Forum's Flickr photostream. Used under a Creative Commons license.

In a recent CNN interview, Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao pledged that China will carry out political reform alongside economic growth. Speaking to Fareed Zakaria, the premier said,

I believe I and all the Chinese people have such conviction that China will make continuous progress and the people’s wishes and need for democracy and freedom are irresistible. I hope you will be able to gradually see the continuous progress of China.


I believe freedom of speech is indispensable for any country, a country in the course of development and in a country that has become strong.

He added that, in order for China to have a “normal order”, reforms must be “conducted within the range allowed by the constitution and the laws.”

In his first interview with a foreign journalist in two years, the remarks are Wen’s third mention of the need for such change in recent weeks. Earlier this month, the premier called for a loosening of the “excessive political control” of the CPC, and last week told the UN General Assembly that the People’s Republic would “push forward” political restructuring.

There has been increasing pressure for political change in China in recent years, much of which has been amplified by the new media revolution giving ordinary citizens a vehicle to express their views. Episodes of dissent have received much Western attention, such as the case of pro-democracy Charter 08 co-author Liu Xiaobo, who was imprisoned for 11 years last Christmas for “incitement to subvert state power.”

However, analysts have reminded us we should treat Wen’s remarks with caution, not as evidence that political reform is rising higher on the Communist Party’s agenda. Speaking to the Guardian, Columbia University professor Andrew Nation said,

It’s impossible to know exactly what Wen means by ‘political reform’ and ‘universal values’ … he probably envisions a great deal less reform and a great deal less human rights than we would think such words imply.

There is also skepticism over whether Wen, who will step down in 2012, has the time or political prowess to instigate such widespread reform. Activist and scholar Chen Yongmiao also told the Guardian,

It is pie in the sky. He only has two years left in office; even if he really sincerely wants it to happen, he cannot make it. For political reform to take place we need a really powerful leader to face the bureaucracy that’s constituted by so many people, to challenge it and to defeat it. Only Mao or Deng has had that kind of power.

Political reform, both at government and grassroots levels, have long been resisted by the CPC for fear of conceding its monopoly on power, and therefore its legitimacy as an authority. Wen has, however, made far greater mention of the need for political reform than President Hu Jintao. Hu instead prefers to err on the side of orthodoxy, emphasising the need for a ‘harmonious society’, often at the expense of addressing the root of China’s pressing social issues.

China and Brazil: one to watch

Brazil's Pavilion at the 2010 Shanghai Expo. Image from triplefivedrew's Flickr photostream. Used under a Creative Commons license.

A topic that has been rapidly picking up speed and column space is China’s ever expanding relationship with Brazil. Since China surpassed the US to become the Latin American giant’s largest trading partner in May 2009, more eyes have been following this shift in global power from the developed to developing economies.

However, as this special report from Reuters recently pointed out, this relationship is also notable for for its profound inequality. Luciana Lopez writes,

The sheer size of the Chinese economy means its needs have begun altering Brazil’s, in ways both salutary and worrisome. The lopsided relationship underscores the profound challenges that China’s emergence as an industrial force poses for developing nations.

In the first half of 2010, China’s investment in Brazil topped $20 billion, more than 10 times all of China’s previous investment in the country. On Friday, Chinese state-owned oil company Sinopec inked a deal with Spain’s Repsol to buy 40% of its Brazilian business for $7.1 billion, giving China access to Repsol Brasil’s estimated reserves of 1.2 billion barrels of oil and gas. Another example of China’s growing presence is the Superporto do Açu, a £1.6bn port and industrial complex undergoing construction along the coast of São João da Barra, Rio de Janeiro state, dubbed ‘Little Shanghai.’ Due to open in 2012, Açu’s pier – or, the ‘Highway to China’ – will be two miles long, accommodating huge vessels known as Chinamaxes that will transport iron ore, grain, soy and barrels of oil to the East.

In order for China to continue its unabashed growth (over the past 30 years it has averaged 10%, with the nation recently surpassing Japan as the world’s second largest economy), its industries need to be supplied with sufficient energy and raw materials. Hence, investments such as the Superporto do Açu. They are evidence of China’s ‘going-out strategy’, as the Guardian’s Tom Phillips explains:

An economic and, some say, diplomatic push for Chinese companies, many of them state-run, to invest abroad, snapping up access to minerals, energy and food by pouring the country’s colossal foreign reserves into overseas companies and projects.

But Lopez argues that China has gone from positively influencing the Brazilian economy to in fact reshaping it.

One case is the soy industry. Exports of soy to China, used for tofu and fuel, have increased by around 18 times in value from 2000 to 2009. In Mato Grosso, western Brazil, exports rocketed by 27 times by tonne in the same period, with China buying approximately one-third of the soy grown in the state. This, Lopez concedes, has brought considerable benefits:

[It] has helped everything from local schools to Brazil’s trade balance. The boost is much needed, as Brazilians, now with a strong currency and economy, are importing and spending abroad more — without soy the numbers would be even more skewed.

The agricultural boom has also helped Brazil outshine more developed nations, with surging growth even as much of the rest of the world continues to struggle. The country notched its fastest annual growth in at least 14 years in the first quarter, a pace that has only slightly slowed as the year progresses.

However, the other side of the coin is that China is purchasing soy grains from Brazil, rather than the more expensive soy oil. An analyst at Agroconsult, an agricultural consulting firm based in southern Brazil, told Lopez, “crushing a tonne of soy beans and separating it into oil and soy meal would add about 12 percent to the pricetag.” As a result, Brazil’s soy industry has been stagnating: while there has been more bean production, crushing has seen little investment.

Another industry facing problems is shoemaking. A town in Rio Grande do Sul that was once known as the shoe capital of Brazil has seen its workforce depleted, with Chinese companies inviting Brazilian workers abroad, particularly to the industrial powerhouse of Dongguan, Guangdong province. The results of this were not pretty:

Brazil’s shoe exports fell almost in half by weight from 2004 to 2009, or 22 percent by dollar value. Over the same time, Brazil’s footwear imports from China more than doubled through last year, when anti-dumping measures kicked in. The government has also slapped tariffs on goods ranging from tires to drillbits.

All this activity has produced quite a fanfare. At the 2010 BRIC Summit in Brasilia, Brazil and China both spoke of the need to diversify bilateral trade, lest the Latin American nation become over-reliant on commodities exports. That China continues to invest so heavily in Brazil is also stirring up anxiety in the West, not least since the US was knocked off its pedestal as Brazil’s major trading partner by the Middle Kingdom itself. China has been, and doubtless will continue to be, blatant in its challenge to the US hegemony in Latin America.

Parallels are also quick to be drawn between China’s Brazil – and wider Latin America – policy and its perhaps more controversial one in Africa (a relationship detailed in this brilliant piece by Howard French). Here, too, the East has displayed its thirst for natural resources, while Chinese firms investing in Africa have notoriously preferred bringing in a Chinese workforce rather than using local labour, therefore not benefiting the communities of the host nations.

The Brazil-China relationship is an important one that requires far more attention as global clout continues to shift. How sustainable Brazil’s incessant sale of commodities to China will prove to be is an ongoing issue open to debate.

Brazil is also undergoing a shift of its own: today the country goes to the polls to elect its new President, with Lula’s successor widely tipped to be his protegee, economist Dilma Rousseff. How the country’s new leader will manage China’s growing presence in the world’s eighth largest economy and, as planned, diversify bilateral trade is an exciting prospect to keep an eye on.